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THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965:
SOME DISSENTING OBSERVATIONS
Charles E. Rice*
On March 7, 1966, the Supreme Court of the United States, over the partial
dissent of Mr. Justice Black, sustained the Voting Rights Act of 1965.' In the
mode of its adoption, the reach of its provisions, and the strength of the reac-
tions it aroused, the act was extraordinary. And the decision which sustained it
was no less so in its legitimation of expanded administrative power and in its
effect upon the balance of federal and state powers. In order to assess the act,
and incidentally the ruling which sustained it, it will be helpful to sketch the
basic voting structure provided in the United States Constitution.
Article I, Section 2 of the United States Constitution provides that voters
for members of the House of Representatives from each state "shall have the
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State
Legislature." The same standard was incorporated into the seventeenth amend-
ment,' adopted in 1913, which provides for the election of United States Sena-
tors by popular vote rather than by the original method of election by the state
legislatures. Thus, the Constitution envisions that each state shall set its own
qualifications for those who may vote in elections for the state legislature, and
those voters are automatically qualified to vote for Representatives in Congress
and Senators.8 Similarly, article II, section 1, provides that, in presidential elec-
tions the members of the electoral college shall be chosen in each state "in such
Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct."
The power of the states to fix the qualifications of voters in federal elections
is subject to certain limitations. In article I, section 4, Congress is authorized to
regulate the "Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives."4 Article II, section 1, empowers Congress to determine the
time of choosing presidential electors and to fix a uniform day on which the
electors shall cast their votes. The nineteenth amendment, adopted in 1920,
prevents a denial of the right to vote on account of sex; and the twenty-fourth
amendment, adopted in 1964, forbids a state to impose a poll tax in elections for
federal officers. (By Supreme Court decision, poll taxes are also forbidden in
state and local elections.')
*Professor of Law, Fordham University. A.B., Holy Cross, 1953; LL.B., Boston College, 1956; LL.M.,
1959, J.S.D., 1962, New York University.
' State of South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 86 Sup. Ct. 803 (1966). The only sections of the act reviewed
were actually JS 4(a)-(d), 5, 6(b), 7, 9, 13(a), and certain procedural portions of S 14. 79 Stat. 437
(1965), 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (Supp. I, 1965).
' The seventeenth amendment provides in part: "[I] . . . The electors in each State shall have the
qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures."
'See Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S, 651, 663 (1884).
'Article I, J 4, prohibits Congress from regulating the places of choosing Senators. But this restriction
has been rendered obsolete by the seventeenth amendment requirement that Senators be elected by popular
vote.
'Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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The most important restrictions on the states' power to set qualifications for
those who may vote in state elections are found in the fourteenth amendment,'
adopted in 1868, and the fifteenth amendment, adopted in 1870.' Under the
fourteenth amendment, it has been held that the right to vote for national
officers is one of "the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,"'
and, therefore, it may not be abridged by any state. More importantly, the
fourteenth amendment provides that a state may not deny the franchise in any
election on any arbitrarily discriminatory basis, for that would be a denial of
"the equal protection of the laws."' The fifteenth amendment, like the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth, has been held to apply to elections for state
and local as well as federal officers.'" Therefore, a state may not restrict the
right to vote in any election, on account of any racial or other invidious discrimi-
nation.
However, it must be kept in mind, as the Supreme Court of the United
States declared in 1937, that the privilege of voting in state elections "is not
derived from the United States, but is conferred by the State and, save as re-
strained by the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments and other provisions
of the Federal Constitution, the State may condition suffrage as it deems ap-
propriate."'" The fifteenth amendment's prohibition against racial discrimina-
tion; the nineteenth's against discrimination by sex; the prohibition in the
twenty-fourth amendment and Court decisions against poll taxes; and the
fourteenth amendment, limit the states' power to determine voter qualifica-
tions. But neither these nor any other provisions of the Constitution deprive
the states of the power to determine voter qualifications. And it is important
to note that both the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments (as well as the
nineteenth and twenty-fourth) confer upon Congress the power to enforce
them "by appropriate legislation." The basic test to measure any congressional
enactment, pursuant to these amendments, to protect the right to vote is then
"The fourteenth amendment provides in part:
Section 1-All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2-But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and
Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers
of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of
such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged,
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be re-
duced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number
of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
Section 5-The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article.
'The fifteenth amendment, provides in full:
Section 1-The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
Section 2-The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
'CI. Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58 (1900); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
'See Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
'
5 See United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 218 (1876).
" Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283 (1937). But cf. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of
Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959).
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as follows: The legislation, to withstand attack, should be "appropriate." It
should be appropriate, moreover, as an enforcement of an amendment primarily
designed, not to displace state power, but merely to regulate its use.1"
In 1957, Congress enacted the first civil rights legislation since 1875. The
Civil Rights Act of 1957" made it unlawful for an individual, whether acting
as a public official or privately, to interfere with the right to vote in any election
for federal officers. 4 The act authorized the Attorney General to institute civil
suits for injunctions in aid of the right to vote as secured by the act; in addition
it authorized the Attorney General to institute such suits in aid of the right to
vote at elections in any state, territory, district, municipality, or other territorial
subdivision."
The Civil Rights Act of 1957 is an example of "appropriate" enforcement
legislation. It made no attempt to displace state standards of voter qualification.
Rather it forbade their discriminatory use.
The enforcement provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1957, including prin-
cipally the authority of the Attorney General to seek injunctions against inter-
ferences with the right to vote, were reasonable in their scope and effect. The
Civil Rights Act of 196016 strengthened these procedures, authorized the ap-
pointment of federal voting referees, and provided safeguards for the perserva-
tion and inspection of federal election records. The Civil Rights Act of 1964"7
forbade discrimination by state or local officials in the administration of literacy
tests as a qualification to vote in any federal election. But it also established "a
rebuttable presumption" of literacy from the completion of a sixth grade educa-
tion in any school where instruction is carried on in the English language."8
This provision, in effect instituting a federal literacy test, operates as a partial
displacement, rather than mere regulation, of state literacy tests.
We now come to the Voting Rights Act of 1965.1" The Civil Rights Acts
of 1957, 1960, and 1964 have not been vigorously enforced. If they were, there
is reason to believe that they would provide ample means for the protection of
the right to vote. For example, when a voter registration drive was begun in
Selma, Alabama, a federal district court issued an order on February 4, 1965,
ordering the registrars of Dallas County to permit all applicants who could
write sufficiently to fill out a simple application form to register as voters by
July 1965. The court further ordered that a federal voting referee, appointed
by the court pursuant to the Civil Rights Acts of 1960 and 1964, would register
the applicants in the event that the local registrars failed to do so."2 The truth
is that the court order of February 4th offered ample assurance that the inde-
"Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
"71 Stat. 634 (1957) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 28, 42 U.S.C.).
"71 Stat. 637 (1957), 42 U.S.C. S 1971(b) (1964).
571 Stat. 637 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c) (1964).
1674 Stat. 86 (1960) (codified in scattered sections of 18, 20, 42 U.S.C.).
17 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 28, 42 U.S.C.).
1678 Stat. 241 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a)(2)(C), (c) (1964).
"79 Stat. 437 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (Supp. I, 1965).
See generally 11 CoNo. REC. 8928-29 (daily ed. May 3, 1965) (remarks of Senator Thurmond).
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fensible discrimination in voter registration in Selma could be promptly elimi-
nated. 1 But the court order was not vigorously enforced.
Whatever else is said about it, it is fair to say that the Voting Rights Act of
1965 was not proven to be necessary to ensure protection of the right to vote
from racial discrimination. For the existing remedies had not been adequately
tried.
But the Voting Rights Act of 1965 is objectionable in its terms as well. It
provides, in section 4, that no state, or subdivision of a state, may apply any
"test or device" as a qualification for voting in any election if: (1) That state or
subdivision maintained "any test or device" as a qualification for voting on
November 1, 1964; and (2) Less than 50 per cent of the persons of voting age
were registered to vote there on November 1, 1964, or less than 50 per cent of
those persons of voting age actually voted in the election November 1964.
The phrase "test or device" means any requirement that a person, as a pre-
requisite for registration or voting, demonstrate literacy, educational achieve-
ment, knowledge, or good moral character (a later section of the act, section
9, would seem to preserve the right of the state to exclude convicted felons from
the ballot), or that he produce registered voters or other persons to vouch for
him.
Thus, section 4 contains an automatic triggering device. Once the condi-
tions listed above are found, the state or subdivision in question is automatically
disabled from establishing its own standards for voting qualifications, regard-
less of whether or not those standards are racially discriminatory in their terms
or enforcement. Moreover, the conditions listed above, which trigger this dis-
ability, have themselves no necessary relation whatever to racial discrimina-
tion." They bring to bear the ultimate sanction of suspension of state voter
qualifications as a result of the accidental coincidence of numerical circum-
stances.
Under section 5 of the act, a state or subdivision can recover the ability to
fix voter qualifications only by order of a federal district court, sitting in Wash-
ington, D.C., if the court finds .that no "test or device" had been used during
the preceding five years in that state or subdivision for the purpose and with the
effect of denying the right to vote on account of race or color. It was on this
point that Justice Black dissented forcefully from the majority decision in South
Carolina v. Katzenbach,28 which sustained the act. After observing that section
5 confers jurisdiction on federal courts where there is no genuine case or con-
troversy, Justice Black voiced his main objection:
Section 5, by providing that some of the States cannot pass state laws or adopt state
constitutional amendments without first being compelled to beg federal authorities to
approve their policies, so distorts our constitutional structure of government as to render
any distinction drawn in the Constitution between state and federal power almost meaning-
2 Contra, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 86 Sup. Ct. 803, 811 (1966); Christopher, The Constitution-
ality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 18 STAN. L. REv. 1, 8 (1965).
' South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 86 Sup. Ct. 803, 813 (1966).id. at 832.
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less. One of the most basic premises upon which our structure of government was founded
was that the Federal Government was to have certain specific and limited powers and no
others, and all other power was to be reserved either "to the States respectively, or to the
people." Certainly if all the provisions of our Constitution which limit the power of the
Federal Government and reserve other power to the States are to mean anything, they
mean at least that the States have power to pass laws and amend their constitutions with-
out first sending their officials hundreds of miles away to beg federal authorities to ap-
prove them. Moreover, it seems to me that § 5 which gives federal officials power to veto
state laws they do not like is in direct conflict with the clear command of our Constitution
that "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government." I cannot help but believe that the inevitable effect of any such law which
forces any one of the States to entreat federal authorities in far away places for approval
of local laws before they can become effective is to create the impression that the State or
States treated in this way are little more than conquered provinces. And if one law con-
cerning voting can make the States plead for this approval by a distant federal court or
the United States Attorney General, other laws on different subjects can force the States to
seek the advance approval not only of the Attorney General but of the President himself
or any other chosen members of his staff. It is inconceivable to me that such a radical
degradation of state power was intended in any of the provisions of our Constitution or
its Amendments.24
A federal law which assumes the power to compel states to submit, in advance,
any proposed legislation they have for approval by federal agents approaches
dangerously near to destroying the states as useful and effective units in the
federal structure of our government.
Another objectionable feature of the act is its substitution, for state voter
qualifications, of a federal regime, which in the thoroughness of its control is
reminiscent of the Reconstruction era. Under section 6 of the act, the Attorney
General, unless overruled by a federal court, can secure the appointment of
federal examiners to take over the election machinery in any state or sub-divi-
sion covered by section 4, if:
1) He has received complaints from 20 or more residents that they have been denied
the right to vote on account of race or color, and he believes those complaints to be meri-
torious; or
2) In his judgment, "the appointment of examiners is otherwise necessary to enforce
the guarantees of the fifteenth amendment."25
Federal examiners may also be appointed by a federal court in the first instance
on request of the Attorney General.2 1 In either event, the examiners take com-
plete charge of the electoral machinery in every election from the presidential
to a local bond issue contest. The thoroughness of this federal control can be
seen from section 12(e). It provides that whenever, within forty-eight hours
after any election, any persons who have been placed on the voter lists by the
federal examiners claim that "they have not been permitted to vote," a federal
district court, on petition of the Attorney General, may direct that the com-
plaining persons be allowed to cast their ballots retroactively before the results
of such election shall be valid. This section could operate as an invitation to
Id. at 834. (Footnote omitted.)
'79 Stat. 439 (1965), 42 U.S.C. S 1973(d) (Supp. I, 1965).
16Ibid.
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bribery and subornation of perjury. In a closely contested federal, state, or
local election, a premium could be placed upon the resourcefulness of defeated
partisans in their efforts to procure persons to swear that they were discrimi-
natorily prevented from voting and to swear (without substantial fear of con-
tradiction) that they intended to vote for the apparent loser. By granting to the
courts the extraordinary power to count uncast votes retroactively in a post-
election investigation, an element of uncertainty could be introduced into the
election machinery.
There are other provisions of the act which deserve a searching criticism
beyond the limitations of these comments. Section 4(e),27 for instance, forbids
states to deny the vote to persons who are illiterate in English if they have been
educated to the sixth grade (or such higher grade as may be presumptive of
literacy in the state in question) in a foreign-language school in Puerto Rico or
other American territory. While Puerto Ricans are citizens, the only official
language of the United States is English and this section will hardly promote
a widely-informed electorate. When the Supreme Court upheld section 4(e) as
"appropriate legislation" to enforce the fourteenth amendment, Justices Harlan
and Stewart protested in dissent against what they regarded as an overextension
of federal power:
To hold, on this record, that § 4(e) overrides the New York literacy requirement seems
to me tantamount to allowing the Fourteenth Amendment to swallow the State's consti-
tutionally ordained primary authority in this field. For if Congress by what, as here,
amounts to mere ipse dixit can set that otherwise permissible requirement partially at
naught I see no reason why it could not also substitute its judgment for that of the States
in other fields of their exclusive primary competence as well.28
Let us, however, recur to the basic issue: Is the Voting Rights Act of 1965
"appropriate" as a means to enforce the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments'
prohibitions against the discriminatory use of state voter qualifications? By
accepted judicial standards, it is not appropriate if it is arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable. 29 It is fair to say that, in its wholesale displacement of state super-
vision over elections and in its substitution of a thoroughgoing federal control,
the act falls short of what can be called appropriate. It may fairly be described,
for example, as arbitrary in hinging the operation of its awesome sanctions
upon the coincidence of statistical circumstances bearing no necessary relation
to racial discrimination. It is capricious in that it applies in states and counties
(in Idaho, Alaska, Arizona, and Maine) 3" where there probably is not a pattern
of racial discrimination, and subjects them to sanctions "appropriate" to pre-
vent a racial discrimination which does not exist there. It is unreasonable in
the pervasive character of its federal regulation and in the degrading com-
plexity and uncertainty of the procedures by which a state can regain its con-
stitutional power over voting qualifications. And it is not wholly irrelevant
" Katzenbach v. Morgan, 86 Sup. Ct. 1717 (1966), upheld the constitutionality of section 4(e).
'Id. at 1738.
See Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 86 Sup. Ct. 803, 813 (1966).
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that the act is unnecessary in that the unused existing legislation was adequate
for the job.
Moreover, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 tends to introduce into the law the
concept of the universal franchise. Where the act applies, mental capacity and
understanding will practically cease to be relevant considerations in determin-
ing access to the franchise. Such a parody of the democratic form could entail
serious harm to the cause of representative government. In the interest of
promoting that cause, it needs to be said that, in terms of qualification to exer-
cise the solemn privilege of voting, there cannot be, in law or in policy, equal
protection for idiots and illiterates without compromising the integrity of the
electoral process.
This writer suggests a constitutional amendment to restore a proper balance
between state and federal powers in the area of voting rights while ensuring
that no one can be deprived of the right to vote in any election on account of
racial discrimination or any other invidious reason:
1. Nothing in this Constitution shall restrict or limit any state in the enactment or
administration of any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or any practice or
procedure governing the registration of voters or the casting or counting of votes, in any
primary or other election, provided that any such qualification, prerequisite, practice, or
procedure shall apply equally and impartially to all to whom it applies, and provided that
the right to vote shall not be denied or abridged on account of race, color, previous condi-
tion of servitude, sex, or failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.
2. Congress shall not enact or administer any voter qualification or prerequisite to
voting or any practice or procedure governing the registration of voters or the casting or
counting of votes, in any primary or other election, and Congress shall not prohibit or
suspend the enactment or administration by any state, acting pursuant to Section 1, hereof,
of any such qualification, prerequisite, practice, or procedure.
3. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation; to regu-
late the times, places, and manner of holding elections for President, Vice-President, electors
for President or Vice-President, Senator or Representative in Congress; and to regulate the
procedure by which the ballots of the Electors for President and Vice-President shall be
cast and counted.
This amendment is not offered with any illusion that its phrasing is in-
fallible. Rather, it is presented here merely to stimulate discussion and an
awareness that something should be done to restore the proper division of
powers between the states and the federal government. The language is tenta-
tive, but the idea is not. An amendment of this sort would restore to the states
their rightful control over the eligibility of voters and the casting and counting
of votes while reserving to Congress its power to regulate in other respects the
times, places, and manner of conducting elections for federal officers. The
amendment would confirm the elimination of poll taxes in any elections and
would also preserve the existing congressional control over the formal pro-
cedures by which the votes of the electoral college are cast and counted in
presidential elections. And, most importantly, this amendment would prohibit
racial and other invidious restrictions upon the right to vote, while maintaining
a proper balance of governmental powers.
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